International and regional measures against Somali piracy: genuine but misguided by Badran, Essam Mahmoud
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
6-1-2010 
International and regional measures against Somali piracy: 
genuine but misguided 
Essam Mahmoud Badran 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Badran, E. (2010).International and regional measures against Somali piracy: genuine but misguided 
[Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/859 
MLA Citation 
Badran, Essam Mahmoud. International and regional measures against Somali piracy: genuine but 
misguided. 2010. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/859 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
The American University in Cairo 
 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MEASURES AGAINST 
SOMALI PIRACY: 
GENUINE BUT MISGUIDED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
 
 
Department of Law 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
The LL.M degree in International and Comparative Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Essam Mahmoud Badran 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2010 
 i 
The American University in Cairo  
 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy  
 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MEASURES AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY:  
GENUINE BUT MISGUIDED 
 
 
A thesis submitted by 
 
Essam Mahmoud Badran 
 
 
to the Department of Law 
 
May 2010 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the 
LL.M Degree in International and Comparative Law 
has been approved by 
 
 
Professor Thomas Skouteris ______________________________ 
Thesis Adviser  
Affiliation ____________________________________________ 
Date ____________________ 
 
Professor Alejandro Escorihuela __________________________ 
Thesis Second Reader 
Affiliation ____________________________________________ 
Date ____________________ 
 
Professor Hani Sayed __________________________________ 
Thesis Third Reader  
Affiliation  ___________________________________________ 
Date  ___________________ 
 
Professor Hani Sayed ___________________________________ 
Department Chair          
Date ____________________ 
 
Nabil Fahmy, Ambassador _______________________________ 
Dean of GAPP 
Date ____________________ 
 ii 
DEDICATION 
 
 
Special thanks to all my family members who supported me while I wrote this thesis, 
especially my beloved father.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I would like to thank Professor Thomas Skouteris for agreeing to supervise my thesis. His 
inspirational thoughts have totally changed my perspective toward international law 
especially in critically examining how international law and justice have been applied on 
the ground and how it should respond to the needs of local people, states, and 
international community. I was really privileged to be taught by an outstanding caliber of 
academic faculty in the AUC Law Department. Special thanks to professors: Hani Sayed, 
Christine Anderson, Eleni Martsoukou, and Gianluca Parolin. Also, I would like to thank 
the exceptional director Legal English Training Unit, Diana van Bogaert, for her efforts 
in preparing students for a smooth transition from undergraduate level to graduate 
studies. And last but not least, special thanks to all of my colleagues who have 
accompanied me on this short yet enjoyable academic journey. Thanks to Ahmed, the 
most helpful and polite person I have ever encountered in my life. My post graduate 
study at AUC was a rare opportunity to meet wonderful characters who will have an ever 
lasting impact on me. We were all one family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
The American University in Cairo 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy  
Department of Law 
 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MEASURES AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY: 
 GENUINE BUT MISGUIDED  
 
Essam Mahmoud Badran 
 
Supervised by Professor Thomas Skouteris 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The increasing piracy in the Gulf of Aden has captured the attention of the international 
community. Somali pirates have proven their ability to attack all types of vessels from 
small yachts to giant oil supertankers. As a result, series of serious efforts by international 
community have been undertaken to put an end to this emerging phenomenon. These 
include, deploying the biggest anti-piracy fleet in modern history, permitting warships to 
purse pirates in Somali territorial waters under special conditions, and the new approach 
toward establishing international tribunals to prosecute pirates. However, there is a 
growing need to re-examine Somali piracy counter-measures and evaluate their 
effectiveness. In this respect, a profound analysis of the circumstances surrounding 
Somali piracy is required. It is crucial to question to what extent the current anti-piracy 
efforts respond to the original roots of the problem and the needs of Somalia. This 
research critically analyzes anti-piracy efforts taken by the international community and 
its impact on the ground. In this regard, a holistic approach was taken to examine Somali 
piracy. Any anti-piracy measures have to respond to the roots of the problem in order to 
guarantee their effectiveness in the long-term. Undoubtedly, building a military coalition 
to patrol ships passing through Somali waters is a needed measure to deter pirates. 
However, it is crucial to ask ourselves to what extent such measures are sustainable and 
to what extent it responds to the roots of the problem. Thus, the international community 
needs to look to the bigger picture and to carefully analyze factors contributing to spread 
of piracy especially off the coast of Somali. The solution to piracy may lie on the land not 
in the sea. 
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I. Introduction 
Seas and oceans has been the theatre for piratical operations for centuries. Although 
maritime piracy is one of the oldest crimes, it is still alive and flourishing on the world’s 
commercial sea-lanes.
1
 Recent years have witnessed a surge in piratical attacks. 
Observers call it: ―a new golden age of piracy.‖2 In response, the international 
community has adopted new anti-piracy measures and new rules of engagement going 
beyond the traditional measures within the framework of International law. It is crucial to 
revisit the modern piracy of the twenty first century by examining piracy off the coast of 
Somalia and evaluating the effectiveness of international and regional anti-piracy 
measures adopted to counter Somali piracy. 
The case of Somali piracy is particularly pressing for five reasons. First, Somali 
pirates are a good example of modern piracy with its sophisticated operations using high-
technology. Second, Somali piracy challenges global maritime security as it poses a 
significant threat to International trade by targeting the strategic area of Gulf of Aden; 
where as 30% of the world oil transports through.
3
 Over 20,000 vessels pass through this 
area each year.
4 Third, Somali pirates have made a record of successful hijacking of all 
types of vessels. According to International Maritime Bureau, there were 111 attempted 
pirate attack the in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, of which 42 were successful, resulting in 
the capture of 815 merchant seamen.
5
 This represents an increase of nearly 200% from 
2007,
6
 accounting for an estimated 40% of the 293 pirate attacks reported worldwide in 
2008.
7
  Further, Somali pirates are accredited for ―the largest ship seizure in history, that 
of the oil-tanker Sirus Star.‖8  
                                               
1 Over 6.8 billion tons of goods are moved by sea annually in a global trade cycle worth $7.4 trillion, with 
up to 90% of international trade traveling by ship at some point. See Generally, Rubrick Biegon, Somali 
Piracy and the International Response, Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/somali_piracy _and_the_international _response.  
2 Kerry Nankivell, Troubled waters, Foreign Policy, Nov./Dec. 2004. 
3 Eric Watkins, Now Russians enter Somalia, Oil & Gas J. 38,(2008). 
4 Rawle O. King, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 6, 
2009. 
5 Mark Hosenball , Raising the Ransoms, Newsweek, Vol.153, April 10, 2009.  
6 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Maritime Piracy: Report: Attacks On Ships Rise 14% Worldwide in 2008, 
EURE, Jan 20 (2009).  
7 Lauren Ploch ET AL., Piracy of The Cost off The Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Service, No.7-
5700 R40528,  Sept.28, 2009.   
8 Daniele Archibugi & Marina Chiarugi, Piracy Challenges Global Governance, Open Democracy, (2009), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/piracy-challenges-global-governance. 
 2 
Fourth, Somali piracy has tremendous economic implications worldwide, in a time of 
global financial crisis. ―By one estimate, due to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the cost of 
insuring a container went from $900 in 2007 to $9,000 in the closing months of 2008.‖9 
The Suez Canal, for example, witnessed a steep drop in revenue affecting Egypt’s main 
source of foreign currency.
10
 Also, the cost of the fuel bill has increased 25% for 
European ships which sail around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Somali piracy.
11
 
Indeed, even the average person will experience higher prices because shipping fees have 
increased due to the increased costs of security, higher insurance premiums, ransoms and 
extra fuel for longer routes.
12
 Ultimately, everyone is affected in one way or another.  
And the case of Somali piracy shows the dynamics existing among pirates, the world 
navies, international organizations, and regional actors. And last but not least, Somali 
Piracy poses a serious test to the traditional legal framework and its efficiency in fighting 
maritime piracy.  
 All of the previous distinctive features of Somali piracy make it the ideal choice to be 
the prime case of study. This research focuses on providing an in depth analysis of 
Somali piracy counter-measures, taken on international and regional levels, and most 
importantly to what extent these measures respond to the roots of the problem. Although 
new and genuine anti-piracy measures were adopted to counter Somali piracy, those 
measures are short term, counter-productive, and fail to respond to the special 
circumstances surrounding Somali piracy. This paper argues that although genuine 
international and regional anti-piracy measures have been adopted to suppress Somali 
piracy, those measures are misguided as they miss the root causes of the crisis. Anti-
piracy efforts in Somalia, simply put, are genuine but misguided. 
The scope of the paper is to examine factors behind the emergence of modern piracy 
in the case of Somali piracy and to monitor the extent to which international and regional 
anti-piracy measures adopted have respond to the causes of piracy. The research does not 
cover historical literature on piracy or in-depth analysis legal framework on piracy.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 Rawle O. King, supra note 4.  
10 Louis Wasse, Somali Piracy Costs Suez Canal Business, Chronicle Foreign Service, April 19, 2009, 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-29/news/17192647_1_somali-pirates-suez-canal-somali-coast. 
11 Sherry Shannon, Ships, Piracy in Numbers, Fin. Main Ed., Nov. 28, 2008, at 26. 
12 Q&A: Somali Piracy, BBC News, Jan. 9 (2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7734985.stm.  
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This paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one provides a background on 
Somali piracy. Chapter two tackles the legal framework in international law applicable to 
maritime piracy. Chapter three highlights anti-piracy efforts, on the international and 
regional levels, to counter Somali piracy. Chapter four critically analyzes those measures 
and concludes that the current anti-piracy measures are counter-productive and inefficient 
because of practical constrains and legal complexities. The last part is the conclusion 
which paves the way for a durable solution to piracy in the Gulf of Aden.   
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II. Background on Somali Piracy 
This section offers in depth analysis of Somali pirates: attacks, tactics, land bases and 
their organizational structure. The perspective of pirates themselves is also highlighted. It 
is hard to separate Somali piracy form Somalia ongoing situation. Certain features of 
Somalia have made piracy possible and allow it to flourish. Thus, a quick overview of 
Somali is needed to grasp the bigger picture surrounding Somali piracy. A special focus 
is given to the main factors contributed to spread of piracy activities launched from 
Somalia. ―If the international community is to comprehensively address the crisis, its first 
task is to understand the background."
13
  
 
A. Overview of Somalia 
Somalia is the country form which pirates initiate their attacks. Back to Somalia, 
pirates bring their kidnapped ships. In Somalia, the hostages are kept till ransom is paid. 
All pirates land bases are located in Somalia. All pirates are Somali nationals, unlike 
piracy elsewhere.
14
 No wonder, all piratical activities in the Gulf of Aden and Indian 
Ocean are attributed to Somali pirates and labeled Somali piracy.  For the first time, 
piracy is associated with one single country: Somalia. The link between Somalia and 
piracy is unmistakable. Therefore, a better understanding of piracy requires shedding 
some light on Somalia ongoing situation.   
Somalia is strategically situated in Eastern Africa bordering the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean with a long coastline extending for 3,025 km.
15
 Somalia, a former British 
(Somaliland) and Italian (the reminder of the country) protectorates, has become 
independent and unified in 1960. After the Somali president, Abdi Rashid Ali 
Shermarke, was assassinated in 1969, the army under Major General Mohamed Siad 
Barre took power and established a dictatorship regime. For two decades Somalia 
enjoyed stability and effective central government, till Barre was ousted in January 1991. 
As a result, a tribal power struggle erupted between clan warlords. The North-western 
                                               
13 Rubrick Biegon , Somali Piracy and the International Response, Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/somali_piracy _and_the_international _response. 
14 See, Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 115, no. 6, 2007 at 1050 (indicating that pirates of the Caribbean between 1715 and 1725, 
for example, were racially diverse and belong to multiple countries unlike Somali pirates).  
15 See Appendix A: Map of Somalia 
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region of Somaliland had unilaterally declared itself independent in 1991, while the 
Government of Puntland controlled the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Since then, 
the Somali state collapsed. In 1992, a desperate attempt by UN peacekeeping forces to 
restore order and safeguard relief supplies miserably failed. As a result, the US mission 
ended in 1994 and UN peacekeepers left Somalia in 1995. The world abandoned 
Somalia, leaving it alone to face its destiny.
 16
  
 In 2004, a two year peace process led by Kenya was concluded with the election 
of Abdullah Yusuf as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of 
Somalia and the formation of an interim government; known as Somalia Transitional 
Federal Institutions (TFIs) which included a 275-member parliamentary body called The 
Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA). The transitional government moved from Kenya 
to Somalia.  However, this weak government has failed to restore peace and order in a 
country torn by ethnic tribal conflict. At the same time, Somalia witnessed relative 
stability with the spread of Islamic Courts in regions where Islamic Shari’a was applied 
by Islamists. Consequently, a union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was established, sweeping 
vast regions of Somalia and attacking the Transitional Federal Government. In December 
2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in support of the Federal government against the UIC. A 
new Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) was headed by UIC to face 
Ethiopian invasion.  In 2007, the UN Security Council authorized African Union 
peacekeeping forces to Somalia.
17
 
New peace talks in Djibouti sponsored by the UN started in June 2008 between the 
TFG and ARS. As a result, a TFG-ARS unity government was formed. In January 2009, 
Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia. A new expanded TFA with 550 seats elected Sheikh 
Shrief Sheikh Ahmed the former chairman of the UIC and ARS to be the new Somali 
president on 31 January 2009. The new president and unity government was widely 
supported by the UN and the West. The TFIs are based on the Transitional Federal 
Charter (TFC), which outlines a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new 
Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national 
                                               
16 Timeline: Somalia, A Chronology of Key Event, BBC News, Feb. 11, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm.  
17 Somalia : Background, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/so.html. 
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elections. However, in January 2009 the TFA amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate 
until 2011. Still, the institutions of TFIs remain weak. Massive world support is needed to 
rebuild the country from scratch. However, little has been done in this area.
18
  
To sum up, Somalia lived almost two decades of political turmoil, civil war, and 
ethnic tribal conflict. Internal fighting has torn the country apart.  Even, the new TFG 
under Sheikh Shrief continues fighting Al-Shabab, a group of radical Islamists with close 
link of Al-Qaeda. The seat of the government in Mogadishu is under heavy fire. The 
government forces and African Union peacekeeping forces continue to fight a bloody 
battle with Al Shabab militia. On the ground, the government of Sheikh Shrief is 
controlling only few kilometers of Somalia, the area around the presidential palace in 
Mogadishu. Therefore, the dream for peace and stability seems to be far away.
19
    
Somalia is a perfect example of a failed state marked with chaos, civil war, absence 
of law and order and deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions. Any state 
consists of three basic elements: people, land, and a sovereign political authority. Somalia 
seems to be missing the third element. As a result, Somalia has no army, police or even a 
justice system. The Somali TFG minister of information has announced that the buildings 
of the new ministries of defense and ministry of interior would be accomplished within a 
year. Although the building would be soon done, improving security on the ground has a 
long way to go. Indeed, absence of effective government has serious implications on 
Somalia and its people.  
Somalia’s sovereignty has been infringed upon in different ways. Firstly, many 
reports indicate that Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial waters has 
been subject to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by Asian and European 
commercial vessels. It was estimated that up to 700 foreign vessels- some of them armed- 
conduct unlicensed fishing off Somalia.
20
  Accordingly, ―over "$300 million worth of 
tuna, shrimp and lobster are stolen every year, by illegal trawlers that fish off the Somali 
                                               
18 Id. 
19 Alan Taylor, Fighting for Control of Somalia, Poston: The Big Picture, May 29, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/05/fighting_for_control_of_somali.html 
20 Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy Off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution1816 and IMO Regional 
Counter-Piracy Efforts, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol 57, July, 2008 pp 690–699, at 
692.  
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coasts.‖21 This inflicts harm on coastal communities and their livelihood. Overfishing 
resulting from illegal fishing threatens Somalia’s natural fishing resources and negatively 
affects Somalia’s economy.22 International community has failed to address this problem 
and have totally ignored it. Despite the fact that this illegal activity has been going on for 
seventeen years and despite the awareness of the international community, no action has 
been taken to stop it.
23
   
Another serious violation of Somalia Sovereignty was revealed by chance. The huge 
waves of the tsunami that hit northern Somalia have revealed a secret that was buried in 
the sea.  The massive tsunami brought with it tons of nuclear and toxic waste illegally 
dumped along the coast off Somalia.  Nick Nuttal, the spokesman for the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP), said ―Initial reports indicate that the tsunami waves broke 
open containers full of toxic waste and scattered the contents.‖24 Mr. Nuttal added that 
―Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting since 1990s 
and counting through the civil war there.‖25 European companies were accused of 
illegally dumping nuclear waste off Somalia, such as, ―[the] Swiss firm, Achair Partners, 
and an Italian waste broker, Progresso.
26
 Consequently, many Somalis living in towns on 
the Indian Ocean coast suffer from radiation sickness, such as ―respiratory infections, 
mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal haemorrhages and unusual skin infections.”27  
However, no serious investigation has been opened on this subject matter. Both the cases 
of illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste off the coast of Somalia have created a 
deep feeling of injustice among Somali people especially communities live near by the 
                                               
21 Saeed Shabazz, Pirates Abound, The Amsterdam News, Vol. 100 No. 16 April 16-22, 2009, at 1.  
22 See Also, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries 
Synthesis Report, Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd, July 2005, (showing that IUU fishing cause 
direct loss of the value of the catches, loss to GNP, loss of lading fees, license fees, and other levies 
payable for legal fishing operators; while indirect impact of IUU includes loss of income, and employment 
in other industries and activities such as fishing equipment, boats and fish processing, packaging, and 
transport).  
23 International Expert Group on Piracy Off The Somali Coast: Workshop Commissioned by The Special 
Representatives of the Secretary General of UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould‐Abdallah (2008).  
24 Jonathan Clayton, Somalia's secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami, Times Online,  
World News, March 4, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article418665. 
25 Alisha Raya, Waste Dumping Off Somalia Coast May Have links to Mafia, Somali Warlords, Voice of 
America, The Environment in the News, United Nation Environment Program, March 16, 2005.  
26 Id. (European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of waste there, costing as little as $2.50 per 
ton where disposal costs in Europe amount to $250 a ton). 
27 Id. 
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coast. The chairman of Somalia Concern Group, Mohamed Gure, has warned that 
―Somali coastline used to sustain hhundreds of thousands of people, as a source of food 
and livelihoods.‖28 
In addition to the above, Somali people are living an ongoing tragedy, a mix of 
natural and man-made disasters.  USAID last Situation Report calls it: a ―complex 
emergency: widespread violence, endemic poverty, recurrent draughts, and floods.‖29 
Recently, the World Food Program (WFP) suspended food distribution in Somalia 
because of insecurity; this decision has a direct impact on half of Somalia’s population 
dependant on humanitarian aid.
30
 Therefore, millions of Somali people, especially 
children with malnutrition, are facing starvation. Somalia is one of the poorest countries 
in the world, ranked 161 of 163 on the UNDP’s Human Development Index.31 Health 
indicators are among the worst in Africa; the life expectancy is 47 years.
32
 Thousands of 
Somalis try to escape their harsh realities through illegal human trafficking. UN officials 
said that ―nearly 30,000 Somalis and Ethiopians came ashore in Yemen in 2007; about 
700 bodies washed up, some gnawed by sharks and another 700 people went missing.‖33 
There are 1.3 million internally displaced persons in Somalia with 400,000 refugees in 
other countries.
34
 The continued humanitarian crisis in Somalia pushed a UN official to 
declare that ―the situation is severe. It is the most pressing humanitarian emergency in the 
world today- even worse than Darfur.‖35 
                                               
28 Najad Abdullahi, Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy, Aljazeera: News Africa, Oct. 11, 2008, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644.html 
29
 Somalia: Complex Emergency, USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 
(DCHA) & Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Situation Report No.8 (2009). 
30 Frank Nyakairu, Children Hit Hardest After WFP Suspends Work in Southern Somalia, Reuters, Jan. 5, 
2010, http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/55866/2010/00/5-162826-1.htm (According to UNICEF, 40 
percent of children in Somalia show signs of chronic nutritional deprivation).  
31 Somalia: Country Brief, World Bank, Aug. 2009, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICA 
EXT/SOMALIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:367675~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:367665,00.html 
32 Id.  
33 Yemen Better Than Somalia, News24, March 5, 200, http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Yemen-
better-than-Somalia-20080228 (Reports estimate 700,000 Somalis living in Yemen. The paradox is that 
Yemen is the poorest Arab Country, but still for many Somalis is better than misery and danger at home. 
Many Somali use Yemen as a getaway to other countries).  
34 Shabazz, supra note 18, at 1. 
35 Emma Batha, Somalia is Worst Humanitarian Crisis, UN Official, Reuters, Jan. 30, 2008, 
http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/1564/2008/00/30-152422-1.htm.(Unlike Darfur, whereas the suffering is 
eased by a billion-dollar aid operation and more than 10,000 workers, Somalia is still consider a no go 
zone. UN officials estimate that the total emergency aid for Somalia is less than $ 200 million), See,  
 9 
1.Factors Behind Emergence of Modern Piracy and Spread of Piracy in Somalia: 
This lengthy background of Somalia is a necessary and integral part of the paper in 
order to grasp the broader picture surrounding Somali piracy. It is now less surprising 
that piracy has taken root in Somalia.  It is crystal clear that certain features of Somalia 
have made piracy possible. Nonetheless, this background is not attempt to come up with a 
theory to explain Somali piracy, but rather an attempt to highlight a number of factors 
which have contributed to the spread of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Before analyzing 
Somali piracy, it is important to explore literature of piracy.  
Piracy: Past and Present 
It is crucial to contrast Somali piracy with piracy on other regions through out history, 
in order to see how modern piracy has evolved over years. Looking back to history of 
piracy offers valuable lessons on countering piracy and distinguishes between different 
types of pirates.  
History reveals two contrasted forms of piracy, a heroic form and a disgracful one: 
privateering and piracy. The first was authorized by the state, by letters of marque and 
reprisal, to raid the ships of declared enemies. Further, the licensor state receives a 
percentage of its privateers’ gains.  In the other hand, pirates were not loyal to any state. 
Thus, they used to attack all ships indiscriminately for their own gain. A heroic welcome 
was waiting for privateers, while harsh punishment was directed toward pirates. The line 
between glory and disgrace was very thin.
36
  
 Throughout the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, privateers and pirates were a 
major threat, especially in the Americas. During Spanish exploration and colonization, 
treasure fleets, which were sent to the new world to bring treasures and precious metals, 
were subject to attacks from pirates and privateers. Therefore, the governments of 
American colonies attempted to suppress both piracy and privateering.
37
  
However, with the end of colonization, a reduction of naval presence was noticed in 
regions where piracy had historically flourished.  Moreover, after the Cold War, most 
                                                                                                                                            
Jeffery Gettleman, Somalia Worst Humaniterinan Crisis in Africa, UN Says, The New York Times, Nov. 
19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/world/africa/20iht-20somalia.8399453.html?_r=1.  
36 The Privateers: Pirates or Soliders, History of Piracy, http://www.thewayofthepirates.com/history-of-
piracy/privateers.php. 
37 Military: Pirates, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates.htm. 
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countries have reduced their naval forces.
 38
 Currently, the volume of merchant ships has 
significantly increased, carrying high-value cargos with small unarmed crews.  Therefore, 
the level of vulnerability is high.  This has paved the way for the re-emergence of modern 
piracy. Modern piracy of the 1990s has special features which distinguish it from the 
more traditional piracy. Modern piracy has witnessed a new level of professional 
organization. Piracy evolved into a more organized form of crime, with a high level of 
sophistication using hi-technology. Piracy has become a sophisticated criminal enterprise, 
including intelligence gathering, ransom negotiations, and multiple coordinated hijack 
operations.
39
  
  Modern piracy can be seen as post-colonial type of piracy which benefited from the 
vacuum of power resulted from the withdraw of colonial naval presence from its former 
colonies. Somali piracy seems to fall within this category.  During the 19
th
 century, 
Italians, French and British controlled the Horn of Africa. The British Royal Navy used 
to have a residence in Aden, due to the proximity of imperial India. Britain continued its 
control of the Somali coastline and the Gulf of Aden, while governing its formal 
protectorate of Somaliland. Britain asserted its presence in the region till the birth of the 
new Somali Republic in 1960. In the following period, a small Somali maritime force had 
attempted to control Somali strategic waters till the regime was collapsed in 1991; Somali 
ports were closed to foreign vessels in 1995.
40
 
 The emergence of piracy indicates the struggle of infant states in controlling their 
vast waters. It is a difficult task for the new newly established states, especially 
developing countries, to fill the vacuum of power left by colonial navies. Strong navies 
with superior technical support are required to ensure control over territorial waters of 
independent states.  While the number of independent states continued to increase during 
1950s to 1960s, the new states raised claims over the limits of national jurisdiction and 
upon exploiting natural resources beyond their territorial waters. This has paved to way 
toward a new maritime framework which was designed to cope with new structural 
changes in world system. Those endeavors have resulted upon the new United Nations 
                                               
38Id. 
39 The Profits of Piracy Soar, The Middle East, 47, 47-50 Nov. 2008.  
40 Gary E. Weir, Fish, Family and Profit: Piracy and the Gulf of Aden,62 Naval War College Review, 15, 
15-28 (2009) 
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Convention of the Sea (UNCLS) in 1982, which is considered as ―constitution of the 
oceans.‖41 However, the problem of inability of developing countries to control its waters 
remains unsolved. Piracy incidents continues to be concentrated in ―areas with little or no 
maritime law enforcement, political and economic instability, and high volume of 
commercial activity.‖42  
J. L. Anderson, in his exceptional article:  Piracy and World History, has identified a 
type of piracy which he termed ―episodic piracy.‖43 This type of piracy accompanies the 
weakening of political power, either on a regional or local level. For example, in the 
seventeenth century, with the decline of the Iberian, Ottoman, Mughal, and Ming 
empires, a surge of piracy spread from the Caribbean to the South China Sea. Disruption 
of trade resulted in the unemployment of both seamen and ships, leading those whose 
livelihood was derived from maritime activity to seek alternatives, which included 
smuggling and piracy. However, when normal levels or patterns of trade were restored, 
this type of piracy disappears.
44
 Accordingly, the collapse of the central government in 
Somalia in 1991 is the defining moment in which the normal pattern of life in Somalia 
was disrupted, causing a surge in piracy. It is a simple cause and effect relationship.  
Piracy offered an alternative to bankruptcy and starvation. An immediate 
consequence of state collapse is the army being dissolved.  Hundred of thousands of 
militants were discharged, unemployed and with no source of income. Many of them 
engaged in clan warfare; others turned to piracy. Well-equipped professional militants 
and expert fishermen together made Somali waters the most dangerous waters on earth.  
There are socio-economic factors that fuel piracy. Pirates are seen as heroes in 
Somalia. This widespread glorification of piracy is a function of a sense of victimhood 
and national humiliation in response to illegal fishing and dumping toxic waste.
45
 Still, 
the characteristics of a failed state in Somalia, which expand to include ―sociopolitical 
instability, dire economic conditions and crushing poverty,‖46 are responsible for making 
                                               
41 Tullio Treves, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 
Audiovisual library of International Law. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html. 
42 Military Pirates, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates.htm. 
43 J. L. Anderson, Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation, Journal of 
World History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall, 1995), pp. 175-199, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078637. 
44 Id. at 193. 
45 Somalia: The Trouble With Puntland, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, Aug. 12, 2009.  
46 Shabazz, supra note 18, at 1. 
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piracy pervasive in Somalia. These harsh realities of life in the context of the chaotic 
political situation onshore have made piracy flourish at sea.  
The final UN report on piracy off the coast of Somalia commissioned by the Special 
Representatives of the Secretary General of UN to Somalia concluded that:  
Poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, 
reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing 
and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and 
continuance of piracy in Somalia. This situation will remain so until there is an 
effective and simultaneous action taken against the pirate trade and an alternative 
means of income support mechanism implemented to replace it; otherwise 
criminal activity, in some shape or form, will continue to take priority as a means 
of generating income among the armed militias of Somalia.
47
 
 
Determining the factors behind Somali piracy is the first step toward finding a 
permanent solution to piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, it is crucial to firstly identify 
the problem before moving to the next step which is solving the problem. Thus, any anti-
piracy measures have to respond to the roots of the problem in order to guarantee their 
effectiveness in the long-term. In this regards, an essential question has to be answered: 
What makes a pirate? What turn an ordinary person into a vicious pirate? 
Somali pirates are a mix of ex-fishermen and ex-militants. Fishermen are turned into 
pirates because they could not sustain their livelihood due to illegal fishing, and nuclear 
waste dumping which have harmed their communities and natural fishing resources. On 
the other hand, ex-militants join piracy as a response to the state collapse, and absence of 
alternative income after losing their jobs in the former Somali army or police force.  
  In the final analysis, I would argue that there are two set of factors contributing to 
Somali piracy: factors relating to Somalia in general and factors relating to coastal 
Somali communities specifically. The first set of factors feeding piracy is the current 
chaotic political situation which is marked by an ineffective central government, civil 
war, and tribal welfare. The second set of factors contributing to piracy originates from 
Somali coastal communities, the breeding ground of pirates. What drives coastal 
communities toward piracy are illegal fishing, nuclear waste dumping, and poverty. 
Consequently, anti-piracy measures have to respond to those two sets of factors feeding 
                                               
47 International Expert Group on Piracy Off The Somali Coast, supra note 20, at15. 
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piracy in Somalia. Before the situation can be resolved, international and regional anti-
piracy efforts will continue to be misguided and surely ineffective.  
 
B. Somali Pirates:  
Piracy in Somalia was not a big issue before 1990; recognizing only minor incidents 
of armed robbery against few small fishing crafts. By the mid 1990s, a more structured 
form of piracy began to take place when armed groups, claiming they were authorized to 
be coast guards responsible for protecting Somali fishing resources, began to attack 
vessels illegally fishing in their territorial waters and held them for ransom. Since 2005, 
this practice has continued against any ship that sails within or close to Somali territorial 
waters. By 2005, attacks of Somali pirates intensified in the Indian Ocean off the cost of 
Somalia. In 2006, pirates extended their theater of operations as far as 350 nautical miles 
off the cost of Somalia, targeting the Gulf of Aden and the mouth of the Red Sea. A surge 
in pirate attacks during 2008 made Somali waters the most dangerous waters in the 
world.
48
 By 2008, the international community had started to react to the threat of piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden in a coordinated, dedicated manner launching the biggest anti-piracy 
mission in modern history.
49
   
1. Bases & Main Groups   
While Somali pirates groups are formed largely on clan or sub-clan lines, but they 
still sometimes recruit members of other clans for their particular skills.
50
 Most of the 
pirates are young in age between 20 and 35.  A pirate gang can consist of 62 men, as in 
the case of MV Faina.
51
 Somali pirates consist of warlords and former fishermen. This 
alliance between warlords and former fishermen has proven to be powerful. In this 
alliance, warlords are the muscle providing arms and ammunitions, and skilled armed 
men; while fishermen are the brains with their knowledge of the sea and ability to pilot 
speed boats and ships. Also, pirate gangs include technical experts who use high-tech 
equipment such as satellite phones, GPS and military hardware. Therefore, a Somali gang 
                                               
48 Piracy Off The Somali Coast, supra note 12, at 14. 
49 Lauren Ploch ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.  
50 Piracy Off The Somali Coast, supra note 12, at 17.  
51 The MV Faina was initially attacked by a gang of 62 men. MV Faina was carrying heavy weapons and 
33 tanks to unknown destination. It is one of high profile attacks by Somali pirates.   
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consists of brains, muscles and computer geeks: ex-fishermen, ex-militants, and technical 
experts.
52
        
There are five main active pirate groups spreading along the long coast of Somalia: 
groups from the Darood clan, are active in coastal towns: Eyl, Garad, and Hobyo; pirate 
groups, from Hawaiye clan, are active in coastal towns in Hardaheere and Mogadishu.
53
 
Puntland is the most important base for Somali pirates. Puntland is the epicenter of piracy 
where piracy penetrates all levels of society even governmental officials of Puntland.
54
 
The East African Seafarers' Association estimates that these five pirate gangs have a total 
of 1,000 armed men and unlimited supply of unemployed young men who are willing to 
be pirates.
55
 For many pirates, piracy is not lucrative a business but rather a means of 
survival.  
The most interesting feature of Somali pirates is that they see themselves as 
coastguards as it appears on names of main pirate groups. For example, one Pirate group 
is called The National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG) which is only targeting fishing 
vessels and small boats in the area around Kismaya on the northern coast. Another groups 
is called The Marka Group named upon the town of Marka from where they operate; 
similar to Puntland Group operating around Puntland. The most powerful sophisticated 
Somali pirate group is known as The Somali Marines which has a fleet admiral, vice 
admiral and head of financial operations.
56
 Another alarming feature of Somali pirates 
that they are expanding by time and building up in terms of military capabilities and 
resource bases; piracy become a powerful rival institution to the Somali government.
57
  
2. Tactics 
Somali pirates’ hijacking techniques have evolved over time. Their successful record 
of high profile attacks reveals their advanced level of organization. No type of vessel is 
immune from pirates attack. Although there are five separate pirate groups operating in 
different regions, they all use the same tactics. Therefore, many believe that these pirates 
                                               
52 Robyn Hunter, Somali Pirates Living The High Life, BBC News, Oct. 29, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7650415.stm.   
53 See Appendix A: Somalia Map 
54
 Piracy Off the Somali Coast, supra note 1, at 17. 
55 Overview: Somalia Pirates Profile, Somali Pirate, http://somalipirate.com/history/.  
56 Military Pirates, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates.htm. 
57 Supra note 7, at 7.  
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follow a code of procedures similar to modern navies. Their sophisticated types of attacks 
are worth noting.  
If the target vessel is within the territorial water or nearby, Somali pirates will use 
speedboats. Around six speedboats, each loaded with six to ten armed men, will surround 
the target from all sides. If the captain refused to surrender, they would fire alarming 
shoots from their automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade (RPG); while one of 
their boats will move toward the ship unnoticed where pirates will gain access using 
grappling hooks and irons to climb aboard. Then they overtake and put all the hostages in 
one place and order the captain to sail toward Somali waters, usually toward Eye Port, the 
headquarters for pirates. Hostages are kept safe, till ransom is paid.
58
  
If the target vessel sails in international waters far awary from Somali waters, Somali 
pirates use the phantom ship technique. They launch their operation from a mother ship 
or ―phantom ship,‖ an ordinary ship which seems non-threatening. Mother ships are 
usually larger fishing vessels which were previously captured and whose owners refused 
to pay ransom to free them
59
 Pirates reuse these ships in their piratical operation as the 
mother ship. They load their speedboats, arms, food, and fuel onto their mother ship. In 
Most of the cases, the mother ships are fishing vessels from neighboring states such as 
Yemen and Egypt. The original crew of the mother ship is asked to act normally, while 
pirates on board try to identify any vessels passing by. Once the target is identified, six 
speedboats are launched immediately from the mother ship to attack the target. This 
technique in hijacking ships has enabled Somali pirates to attack ships far away from 
Somalia.
60
 This technique is swift and surprising. Captains realize that they are under 
attack late. The average time for a pirate attack is fifteen to thirty minutes.
61
 It is 
extremely difficult to distinguish a pirate mother ship from any ordinary ship since 
pirates’ mother ship does not carry the Somali flag.  
Unlike pirates in other parts of the world, Somali pirates do not steal the hijacked ship 
and its cargo. Somali pirates create hostage situations. They ask the owner of the hijacked 
vessel to pay ransom in exchange for the ship and its crew. Once ransom is delivered, the 
                                               
58 Supra, Q&A: Somali Piracy, note 12.  
59Lauren Ploch, supra note 7, at 9.   
60 See appendix C: Range of Pirates Attacks. 
61 Lauren Ploch, Id, at 9.  
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crew and their ship are released. Somali pirates are known for taking care of their 
hostages to ensure ransom is paid. Another distinctive feature of Somali piracy is that 
pirates do not try to hide the hijacked ships; they sail openly toward the Somalia coast. 
Pirates either keep the hostages in their ship near the Somali coast or take them ashore till 
ransom is paid. It is estimated that pirates gained $ 150 million of ransom payments in 
2008.
62
  
E. Somali pirates Side of the story  
How little we know about pirates themselves! Analysts, observers, and commentators 
warn us of their threat to maritime security. The personal side of the pirates is not 
presented. For pirates elsewhere, famous captains and their stories are publically known. 
None of the Somali pirate captains are widely known. May be Somali pirates are ordinary 
youth. However, a few rare interviews with Somali pirates have managed to bring 
pirates’ perspective into the surface.   
The questions of the following interview were sent to a Somali journalist who 
managed to conduct this interview with one of the Somali pirates, named Said who based 
in Gu’ard. This interview reveals how pirates see themselves and offers inside 
information on their tactics, organization, and ransom arrangements. The purpose of the 
interview is to fairly represent pirates’ perspective in the subject. By the way, the full 
interview was republished on online website.
63
  
How did you become a pirate?  
Saaid: I was a fisherman in Gar'ad, a coastal village in Somalia’s Mudug region, before I turned into a 
coast guard. We decided to counter illegal fishing along our coastlines ourselves, and to protect our 
resources from foreign looters who destroyed our fishing equipment. 
 
Illegal foreign fishing vessels have taken all the fish, big and small. Nothing was left for us. They even 
fished about 2 to 3 miles near our coastlines. At that time, we only had AK-47, assault rifles, and other 
small weapons but we had more skiffs. We used to attack one foreign fishing ships by 200 skiffs, while 
each skiff carries onboard 3 pirates armed with AK-47. No one was supporting us financially at that time. 
 
Also, we have seen foreign ships dumping toxic waste nearby our shore, resulting in the death of fish and 
affecting the health of many coastal villagers. Therefore, we decided to capture the vessels before they 
dump toxic waste in our sea. 
 
What are the tactics you use to hijack ships?  
                                               
62 Supra, Q&A: Somali Piracy, note 12. 
63 Interview: A Somali Pirate Reveals his Career Story, Politics in Depth: Africa, Jan. 4, 2010, 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-
Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout&cid=1258880415993 
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Saaid: A big boat (mother ship) and two small high-speed boats will go together. Each small boat carries 
five pirates armed with Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGs) and sophisticated GPS and AIS (Automated 
Information Systems). 
 
When we receive a signal of a cargo ship transiting nearby, we set our perimeters and launch the attack 
from the two skiffs while the mother ship backs us. 
 
We chase the target, firing weapons at the captain’s mast; some captains give up, while others speed off. 
Those we seize; we order the captain of the vessel to send signal informing the nearby forces that we are 
onboard. Then, the vessel changes its direction and sail towards Somali coast. 
 
How do you deal with the hostages? Do you strip them of personal properties? 
Saaid: We have a code of conduct that outlines how we will deal with the hostages, we respect the 
hostages. We don't touch their personal properties or the cargo of the hijacked ship. We don’t rope them 
and ask them ransom but we deal with the owner of the seized ship. Our aim is to get money and we only 
deal with the ship owner. 
 
How is the ransom delivered to you? 
Saaid: The ransom money reaches us in two ways. First, we are not connected to any port; our station is 
where we operate. A warship from the country that owns the ship delivers the money if the money is more 
than $1.5 million. If the money is less than $ 1.5 million, we use other ways including money transfer 
systems locally known as Hawala. 
 
And how is it divided? 
Saaid: The gentle pirates who captured the vessel take 50%, and the groups which provided financial 
support take 40%, and the rest 10% is for the guards who stay with the hijacked ship at the coast and the 
people who work with us until we get the ransom. 
 
What if a ship owner refused to pay ransom? 
Saaid: We do two things if  the owners refused to pay ransom for their seized ships. We move the ship's 
crew to the shore including the captain until the owner pay the ransom which we demanded. If not, we use 
the ship to hijack other ships. 
 
Who funds your piracy operations? 
 
Saaid: Most of the pirates are young men; nobody really finances our operations; we have umbrella groups 
which do everything we need including financing our operations. 
 
From where do you get your weapons? 
Saaid: Somalia has weapons from all the world. We get weapons from inside and from outside the country; 
mostly we buy from our neighboring countries illegally. 
 
Any country in particular? 
Saaid: Yemeni illegal arm dealers supply us. 
 
What is the most dangerous situation you have ever faced while in a piracy operation? 
Saaid: We were nine of us on a boat seafaring more than a thousand miles off Somalia over a month and 
three days. We were unlucky and decided to return to shores but some 120 miles off the shorelines, we 
encountered one of the worst tragedies. 
 
We saw a cloud of dust whirling and scores of high-tweeting birds flying over the waters. All over the 
sudden, the waters became so rough and the boat was half sunk. Only one of us, who was on the lower part 
of the boat, remained onboard. He was the one who could rescue us. 
 
Later, we have discovered that the dust was caused by a toxic waste dumped by a ship that immediately 
fled the area. 
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How do pirates manage to deal with warships patrolling Somali waters? 
Saaid: The warships are here to fight, so we are prepared all the time for it. Nevertheless, when we 
encounter them in the high seas, some of us send their weapons overboard and claim that they are illegal 
immigrants. 
 
Others will decide to fight them and the mighty will prevail; while other groups will simply decide to flee. 
 
If they were in three boats, they will divide themselves and start fleeing in three different directions. The 
forces will go after one boat and the rest will escape. 
 
Do you have one leader or each group has its own leader? Is there a form of coordination between 
Somali pirates? 
Saaid: The pirates belong to different groups, but we have umbrella groups. There are two main groups; 
one in Puntland and the other in south and central Somalia. I am a member of the one in Puntland. 
 
We stay in contact and we respect each other. For example, when a group of pirates in Gar'ad takes ransom 
they will share it with their friends in south and central Somalia and vice versa. 
 
IOL: Do pirates have a network of intelligence in ports around Somalia such as in Yemen or Kenya? 
Saaid: No, we don't have any link with the ports around Somalia. We reach only the border near Kenya and 
back to our positions in Somalia.. But, we reach secretly to the coasts of Yemen to buy high-speed boats 
and arms illegally. 
 
IOL: Do you think piracy will end here one day? And when? 
Saaid: Piracy will end when the government of Somalia restores law and order; when the world really 
wants to protect the Somali waters and stops dumping toxic waste and leave the coast of Somalia. 
I mean you can't pretend to correct things on the land while you destroy the sea. Multinational warships 
must leave the Somali waters. Otherwise, piracy will remain forever.   
 
 
3. Current Situation 
Pirates are more dangerous than ever. World navies have failed to deter them. Recent 
statistics are very alarming. The first 9 months of 2009 have shown that the Somali 
pirates expanded their operation from Gulf of Aden and the east Coast of Somalia to the 
southern part of the Read Sea, the Bab el Mandab Straits and the east coast of Oman.  
International Maritime Bureau announced that year 2009 witnessed unprecedented 
increase of pirate activity off Somali coast. Somali pirates are responsible for a total of 
168 incidents reported in the first nine months 2009,
64
 with a total of 533 crew members 
have been hostages,
65
 accounting for more than the half of reported attacks.
66
 . The rate of 
pirate attacks doubled in the last three months of September to November 2009.
67
 The 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8598726.stm.  
 
 
 19 
accelerating pace of pirate attacks continued in 2010. According to EU naval force there 
was nine hijackings in March 2010 alone.
68
   
 The next chapter explores the legal framework governing piracy. This is followed 
by discussion anti-piracy measures against Somali pirates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
68 Id.  
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II. Piracy and International Law 
For centuries, seas and oceans were loosely governed. Since the seventeenth century, 
the concept of freedom of the seas was the dominant rule; whereas national rights only 
extend to the narrow belt of waters from state’s coastline. It was three miles, a range of a 
canon at that time. Waters behind it were regarded high seas; belonging to no one, 
whereas all states enjoyed freedom of navigation. High seas are ―res communis, or the 
common property to all nations.‖69  Only in the early twentieth century, United Nations 
Convention on The Law of the Sea (UNCLS) have replaced the concept of freedom of 
the sea and designed a comprehensive legal framework with more than 400 articles.
70
 It 
determined territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and international waters.
71
   
The High Seas Convention and United Nation Convention on The Law of the Sea 
(UNCLS) set the legal framework for tackling piracy. It identifies piracy, states’ duties in 
the repression of piracy and the seizure procedures of a pirate ship. The effectiveness of 
UNCLS legal framework in tackling Somali piracy is addressed in chapter four.  This 
chapter explores the legal framework applicable to maritime piracy, focusing on legal 
definition, states’ obligations, and tradition anti-piracy measures. Difficulties of 
enforcement are sufficiently addressed, as piracy continues to contest the legal 
framework governing seas.  
A. Legal definition 
 The legal definition of piracy is crucial in identifying acts which constitute the 
crime of piracy. Piracy is one of the oldest crimes. The crime of piracy is a well-known 
example of a crime relating to pre-existing customary international law. For over two 
thousand years, world’s nations have regarded pirates as enemies of the human race 
―hostes humani generis.‖72 The High Seas Convention of 1958 and the UN Convention 
on The Law of the Sea of 1982 codified those rules into a treaty law. The codified 
definition of piracy is ―generally, thought not universally, accepted‖ as codified 
                                               
69 Bernard G. Heinzen, The Three Miles Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 
664 (1959), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1226663. 
70 Tullio Treves, supra note 41.  
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customary international law. UNCLS defines piracy in article 101 as any of the following 
acts:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends 
by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board 
such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).73 
 
 Although this article defines acts of piracy committed by private ship, piracy can be 
also committed by a warship or government ship, whose crew has mutinied and taken 
control of the ship. In this case, their acts would be assimilated to acts committed by a 
private ship.
74
  That is because the crew, in this instance, is acting on its own. The state 
lost control over its warship, while the crew attacks ships for private ends.  
 The crime of piracy in international law can be committed on international waters, 
including the high seas and the exclusive economic zones. If the same acts were 
committed within internal waters or territorial sea, those acts would not be a crime of 
piracy, but rather a crime of armed robbery against ships, and would be subject to a 
nation’s domestic jurisdiction.75 However, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has 
suggested another definition in an attempt to expand the scope of piracy to ―include 
boarding to steal or commit some other crime and the actual and implied use of force by 
perpetrators.‖76 Piracy threatens navigational safety regardless of the location, whether 
the crime was committed was in the high seas or territorial waters.
77
 It is questionable 
whether a change in the location may change the nature of the crime. The paradox is that 
piracy mainly occurs in territorial waters near ports and rarely takes place in international 
waters.  
                                               
73 United Nation Convention on The Law of the Sea art.101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.  
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75
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 The convention of the Sea stresses on the element of private purpose ―animus furandi‖ 
in the crime of piracy to be distinguished form political activity.
78
 However, this 
definition does not exclude politically motivated violence. It basically means that 
violence is not public. Pirates are acting not on behalf of their states but rather for their 
private interests. The words of ―for private ends‖ was originally included to the definition 
of piracy to ―acknowledge the historical exception of civil war insurgencies who attacked 
only the vessels of the government they sought to overthrow.‖79  However, many state’s 
officials at all levels, throughout history, have profited and secretly sponsored acts of 
piracy.
80
 Thus, giving a blind eye and taking no active measures toward pirates raises 
doubts about state responsibility.  
 On the other hand, piracy might be socially accepted in a number of societies and an 
entire coastal community’s economy might be based on piracy. Eradication of piracy in 
this instance would be hard. Law is not targeting criminal individuals but rather 
communities. It is problematic when piracy becomes a basic activity for survival. Also, 
piracy becomes more complex in the case of a state claim of a historical right and 
authority to tax nearby shipping lanes. Conflicting claims of state authority over 
historical waters is a challenge. In this case, can state actions of arresting and detaining 
crew and confiscating boats in its historical waters be regarded as piracy? 
B. States’ obligations in the repression of piracy 
 Fighting piracy requires a well-coordinated response. That is because the crime of 
piracy takes place on the high seas, outside all state’s jurisdiction targeting foreign 
vessels. The overwhelming international dimensions of the crime require an international 
coordination. 
 Therefore, all state are under legal duty to fully cooperate to the fullest possible extent in 
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any state.
81
 Both the High Seas Convention and UN Convention on The Law of the Sea 
stressed the importance of cooperation in fighting piracy. That is because piracy is an 
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international crime which threatens the security and safety of navigations in the high seas. 
No single country, regardless of its naval power, can unilaterally suppress piracy. 
Coordinated efforts are a must.  
 International law did not elaborate upon the nature or level of cooperation. A regional 
form of cooperation between coastal states is very effective in suppressing piracy. 
International organizations, such as International Maritime Organization (IMO), play a 
key role in coordinating international efforts in fighting piracy on the high seas. 
Therefore, there are multiple levels of coordination from regional level to the 
international level or military verses civilian cooperation.  
C. Traditional Anti-Piracy Measures in International Law 
 International law specifies certain rules of engagement to be followed by warships in 
capturing and prosecution of pirates. This section is particularly important in determining 
the effectiveness of legal framework in tackling piracy. Then, problems arise from legal 
framework is foll0wed. 
 International law allows the seizure of a pirate ship and the arrest of pirates on board. 
To begin with, UN Convention on The Law of the Sea defined a pirate ship as:  
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons 
in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred 
to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any 
such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.
82
 
 
According to article 105 of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, once a pirate ship is 
identified, every state may seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates. Nonetheless, the seizure of a pirate ship must be done on the high seas. 
Therefore, any state can seize a pirate ship on high seas and arrest the persons and seize 
the property on board. In this regard, the courts of the state which carried out the seizure 
may try them and determine the action to be taken with regard to ships, and property on 
board. However, this would be subject to the rights of the third parties acting in a good 
faith.
83
    
A seizure of a pirate ship is only authorized to be carried out by warships or ―other 
ships clearly marked and identified as being in government service and authorized to that 
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effect.‖84 Therefore, any state warship or government vessel may board a ship suspect of 
piracy as an exception to the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.
85
 However, 
if ―the seizure of a ship on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate 
grounds, the state making the seizure shall be liable for any loss or damage caused by the 
seizure.‖86In addition, any state under international customary law can persecute a pirate 
found within its territory, as an exercise of universal jurisdiction.
87
  
D. Difficulties of Enforcement 
Common difficulties are associated with the enforcement of international law in 
regards to piracy. Firstly, prosecuting pirates is a challenging task because pirate attacks 
occur outside the territorial waters of any state. The enforcement jurisdiction granted to 
all states to purse pirate ships in international waters does not extend to the territorial sea 
of any state. In traditional cases of hot pursuit, pursuit must cease ―as soon as the ship 
pursued enters the territorial sea of its own [flag] state or a third state.‖88 Pirates’ ability 
to escape pursuit by crossing into territorial waters remains a serious challenge to efforts 
to suppress piracy.  
The second difficulty in prosecuting pirates is that pirates tend to ―seek a sanctuary in 
countries whose judicial system is ill equipped to prosecute them.‖89 Pirates seek refugee 
on remote islands or in countries with weak governments. Most developing countries 
overlooking the sea are not well-equipped to protect their waters which require well-
stationed naval forces with sufficient technical support. Therefore, rogue states waters are 
loosely governed, if governed at all. Consequently, the High Seas Convention and 
UNCLS lack enforcement in such instances. Actually, the UNCLS desperately calls on 
developed countries to provide assistant to developing countries in protecting their 
waters. However, those calls are met with silence.  Thus, prosecuting pirates in such 
circumstances is a real challenge. 
A third problem in prosecuting pirates is the absence of national legislation 
criminalizing piracy in most countries. Indeed, very few countries have ratified laws 
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attacking the problem.
90
 Despite the fact that piracy is an internationally recognized 
crime, states’ national legislation is a step behind. And internal laws do not fully 
incorporate the crime of piracy. Since there are no international tribunals for pirates, they 
are placed on trail in front of a national court. The absence of national laws on piracy 
constrains local courts’ ability to prosecute pirates. Even countries which have legal 
grounds to prosecute pirates are not always keen and willing to do so.  
The lack of evidence is another serious challenge in prosecuting pirates. Pirates tend 
to drop their weapons on the sea before their arrest which frustrate possible legal actions 
taken against them.. Witnesses, on the other hand, are on the move and very reluctant to 
engage in a long journey of prosecution and subsequent trials.  
Another common problem of enforcement rises when piracy, although illegal, is 
sometimes socially accepted practice with a community. Indeed, piracy is an accepted 
aspect of the culture in Southeast Asia and Africa and other parts of the world. In this 
regard, piracy is a source of supplemental income and means of survival.
91
 Therefore, it 
is extremely difficult to prosecute an entire community. And individual arrest of pirates is 
ofthen pointless.  
In the final analysis, international law is very brief and ―has little to say about the 
manner, in which piracy may be suppressed.‖92 Rules of engagement governing the 
conduct of suppressing piracy on the high seas remain ―embryonic, found in a limited 
case law and inferences from treaties.‖93 Still, any use of force in suppressing acts of 
piracy must be ―necessary, proportionate, and should be proceeded by warning shots 
where practicable.‖94 
The legal framework applicable to the crime of piracy has to be re-examined. Piracy 
poses a difficult test for the current international legal system governing seas. The shaky 
maritime legal foundation creates a fragile security on the high seas, threatening maritime 
navigation.   
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IV. Measures against Somali Piracy  
In the wake of the unprecedented upsurge of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden in 
2008, the global shipping industry and its insurance companies have called on 
governments to take immediate action to suppress piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian 
Ocean.
95
The international community reacted quickly to the danger of piracy given the 
region’s strategic location.96  Right now, ―the Gulf of Aden is currently being patrolled 
by one of the largest anti-piracy flotillas in modern history.‖97 This chapter explores 
international and regional efforts taken to counter Somali piracy.  
A. International Measures 
The unprecedented threat of Somali pirates on international trade and freedom of 
navigation in the strategic area of Gulf of Aden have provoked a decisive international 
response. The repeated attacks on vessels of Word Food Program have induced United 
Nations to alarm international community of the growing piracy off the Somali coast. The 
growing number of victims of Somali pirates from crew members, ship owners, and 
insurance companies, had pressured their government to take active measure to put and 
end to piracy. The international community decisively responded by deploying the 
biggest modern anti-piracy mission under United Nations new mandate which unleashed 
naval warship to take all necessary means to pursue, arrest and prosecute pirates.  
1. United Nations Security Council  
The Security Council has played an active role in fighting Somali piracy. A series of 
resolutions have been dedicated to tackling Somali piracy apart form Somalia’s ongoing 
situation. Resolution 1816 of June 2008 authorized states acting in cooperation with and 
with prior notification of the TFG to:  
(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the 
high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law; and  
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action 
permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, 
all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.
98
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This was a proactive stance in fighting piracy. For the first time, a state warship can 
suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery not only on the international waters, but also in 
the territorial waters of Somalia. This only requires the permission of the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its notification of the UN Secretary General. 
The initial authorization lasted for six months from June 2008. The absence of effective 
coast guards, police, and efficient judicial system in Somalia encouraged the Security 
Council to adopt such unprecedented resolution acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations.  This resolution was passed with Somalia’s consent.99 However, 
this resolution is contrary to states’ obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and High Seas Convention. That is why the resolution affirms that the 
authorization to enter the territorial water of a state applies only with respect to Somalia 
and ―shall not affect the right or obligations, or responsibilities of member states under 
international law…and shall not be considered as establishing customary international 
law.‖100 Thus, the authorization was exceptional to the case of Somalia.  
In addition, resolution 1816 leave the choice of jurisdiction to be determined by the 
concerned states and list possible jurisdictions such as ―flag, port, and costal states, state 
of the nationality of victims or perpetrators and other states with relevant jurisdiction and 
international law and national legislation.‖101 
Subsequent Security Council Resolution 1838, adopted on the 7
th
 of Oct. 2008 called 
on all states in the region to deploy their naval vessels to participate in the fight against 
piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia.
102
 This resolution urged states to 
continue to help protect the World Food maritime convoys.
103
  
Another Security Council Resolution 1846 extended the mandate established in 
Resolution 1816 to enter Somali territorial waters and the use of all necessary means to 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery. Resolution 1846 extended this mandate for 
another period of twelve months.
104
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On the 16
th
 of December 2008, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 151 inviting 
states fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia to conclude a special agreement or 
arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law 
enforcement officials (―shipriders‖) from the latter countries, in particular countries in the 
region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained.
105
 In actuality, 
most pirates arrested by navel vessels were delivered to Somalia’s neighboring countries, 
mainly Kenya and Yemen. It seems that the UN seeks an official arrangement in this 
respect, after serious doubts were raised about the judicial capacity of those two states. 
Another key issue Resolution 1851 touched upon is the importance of establishing a 
cooperation mechanism between states fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia to form a 
regional center to coordinate information and increase regional capacity.
106
    
As a result, a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 
made up of 24 member governments and five regional and international organizations 
was formed based on Resolution 1851. In January 2009, the contact group’s first meeting 
was held. The main goal of the Contact group is to ―improve operational coordination, 
information sharing, and the effectiveness of legal enforcement activities among all 
regional and international actors combating piracy in the region.‖107The latest meeting of 
the CFPRS was held in New York in September 2009, in which a U.N. administrated 
trust fund to help to finance the costs assumed by regional states for the prosecution of 
piracy suspects.
108
   
The latest Security Council Resolution concerning Somali piracy was adopted in 
November 2009, renewing the authorization of states to enter Somali territorial waters to 
fight piracy and armed robbery against ships with the permission of the TFG and the 
notification of the UN General Secretary. The authorization was renewed for another 
twelve months.
109
 In the Meantime, the Security Council expressed its intention to renew 
the authorization for additional periods upon the request of the TFG. The most recent 
development was adoption of a new Security Council Resolution 1918, on 27 April 2010, 
calling for states especially states in the region to criminalize piracy under their domestic 
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law and favorably consider the prosecution of suspected pirates apprehended off the coast 
of Somalia. Most importantly, the Secretary-General was asked to present a report on 
possible options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international 
components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding 
imprisonment arrangements taking into account the existing practice in establishing 
international and mixed tribunals and the time and resources necessary to achieve and 
sustain substantive results.
110
 Still, the situation is evolving. International efforts to 
prevent piracy in Somalia have rapidly developed at an unprecedented pace.  
In the final analysis, the long series of resolutions adopted by the Security Council 
has focused in three levels; the first is to develop a coordinated response among countries 
engaged in fighting piracy in Somalia. The UN succeeded in this respect with the 
formation of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The second 
is to encourage states to assist TFG to bring justice to pirates operating in their land. The 
third is to support International Maritime Bureau (IMB) to continue to develop and 
implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and guidelines to follow 
when under attack or sailing in waters of the Coast off Somalia with coordination with 
shipping and insurance industries.
111
  
2. International Anti-Piracy Operations 
Somali pirates attracted the biggest modern anti-piracy military operation, given the 
number of the countries taking apart and the size of naval presence dedicated to counter 
Somali pirates. In this regard, there are three coalitions of naval forces have been 
deployed on the Gulf of Aden operating under different umbrellas but unified on one goal 
to stop and deter Somali pirate attacks. Besides, individual countries unilaterally sent its 
warships to protect vessels carrying their flags passing off Somali waters. Thus, the area 
of the Gulf of Aden and surrounding Somali waters experiencing extraordinary military 
presence.  
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I. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) 
In January 2009, the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) 
established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with the sole mission of conducting 
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the 
Indian Ocean.  The CTF-151 composes of naval ships and assets from more than twenty 
nations,
112
 under the US commander Terence Mcknight.
113
 The CTF-151 consists of 
approximately two dozen ships. The command center of CTF-151 is located in Bahrain. 
Before the establishment of CTF-151, this area was under the charge of CTF-150 which 
has performed counter-terrorism and maritime security operations since 2001. In August 
2008, CTF-150 and partner forces established the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) 
in the Gulf of Aden ―to serve as a dedicated, more secure transit zone for merchant 
vessels.‖114 MSPA was effective in reducing Somali pirates’ attacks in the Gulf of Aden 
transit zone.  
According to United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), in the 
period of January 2009 to August 2009, CTF-151 ―encountered 527 pirates; 282 of which 
were disarmed and released, 235 disarmed and turned over for prosecution, and 10 were 
killed.‖115  
2. NATO: Operation Ocean Shield 
In addition to Combined Task Force 151, NATO deployed its own anti-piracy 
operation. In October 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed its 
first anti-piracy operation, named Operation Allied Provider, to serve as a temporary 
protection force for World Food Program assistance shipments in the Horn of Africa.
116
 
This operation only lasted for two months, before NATO end it and reassigned the task of 
protecting WFP maritime cargos to the European Union’s new naval operation.   In 
March 2009, NATO initiated a new anti-piracy mission named Operation Allied 
Protector under the command of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). The 
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mission was to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities. In August 2009, NATO 
replaced Operation Allied Protector with a new anti-piracy mission, named Operation 
Ocean Shield, under the command of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). The 
new mission of Operation Ocean Shield is to fight piracy and contribute in capacity 
building efforts with regional governments. Warships form United Kingdom, Greece, 
Italy, Turkey, and US are taking part in Operation Ocean Shield.
117
  
3. European Union: Operation Atlanta 
      European Union joined international anti-piracy efforts The European Union 
launched its first naval operation, EUNAVFOR Somalia-Operation Atlanta, under the 
framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Operation 
ATALANTA's mission is to: ―provide protection for vessels chartered by the WFP; 
provide protection for merchant vessels; employ the necessary measures, including the 
use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and 
armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present.‖118 Rear 
Admiral Peter Hudson (UK) commands the operation from the Operational Headquarters 
at Northwood, United Kingdom. More than twenty vessels and aircraft take part in 
EUNAVFOR, i.e. more than 1,800 military personnel. The main EU countries taking part 
in the operation are: Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, 
Belgium and Luxembourg. Non-EU countries which have joined the operation are: 
Norway, Croatia and Montenegro. The running costs of the Atlanta Operation amount to 
EUR 8.3 millions for the first year shared between EU member states.
119
  
    Under Operation Atlanta, military personnel can arrest, detain, and transfer suspects 
who may be prosecuted by an EU member state or by Kenya, under an agreement signed 
on March 2009, with the EU and Kenyan authorities, or to Seychelles.
120
   In the period 
of August 2009 to January 2010, the number of WFP vessels escorted by Atlanta reached 
57 plus 20 escorts for AMISOM.
121
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     According to the  EU, its naval force in the Horn of Africa is a part of a global action 
initiative conducted by the EU to tackle the Somali crisis with its political, security and 
humanitarian dimensions. On hand, EU supports the African Union military mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) financially, in terms of planning, and capacity building to increase 
the efficiency of the Somali police force. On the other hand, the Joint Strategy Paper for 
Somalia for 2008-2013 provides an allocation of EUR 215, 8 million under the EC's 10th 
European Development Fund (EDF). Further, On 22 and 23 April 2009, the International 
Conference in support of the Somali Security Institutions and the AMISOM was held in 
Brussels, organized by the UN, the EU and the African Union. Almost USD 213 million 
was pledged to help the Somali Transitional Federal Government bring about peace and 
stability.
122
  
4. National Escort 
     Other countries have deployed their naval forces to the Horn of Africa to take part in 
monitoring and anti-piracy ―National Escort system‖ operations. Those countries main 
task is to protect vessels carrying their flag passing by the Gulf of Aden. Although those 
countries are not operating under CTF-151 or Atlanta, they coordinate with other 
coalitions through a military coordination mechanism known as Shared Awareness and 
De-confliction (SHADE). The main countries taking part in the anti-piracy national 
escort system are Russia, China, and India.
123
  
 
B. Regional Measures  
Paralleled to international efforts to suppress Somali pirates, regional efforts are also 
taken. There are many regional efforts such as Arab League conference on Somali 
pirates. However, Djibouti Code of Conduct is the most important regional mechanism 
because it contains new measures and rules of engagement to counter Somali pirates. 
Also, Djibouti Code of Conduct was sponsored by key international and regional 
organization and contains practical steps tackling Somali piracy. Therefore, this section 
focus on Djibouti code of conduct as unique regional anti-piracy effort against Somali 
pirates.   
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1. The Djibouti Code of Conduct 
      The International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched a successful international 
anti-piracy program in the late of 1990s which successfully engaged regional countries in 
on multilateral basis to improve anti-piracy cooperation. This program succeeded in 
suppressing piracy in the Strait of Malacca and other regions in Asia.
124
    
      With the emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the IMO has attempted to adopt 
the same cooperative mechanisms against piracy in the Horn of Africa.  In 2005, the IMO 
began sponsoring consultation meetings on piracy in the Horn of Africa region, which 
developed into a draft of a cooperative framework agreement in early 2008. In January 
2009, representatives of seventeen regional governments met at an IMO-sponsored 
meeting in Djibouti and adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.  By 
the end of January 2009, nine regional governments had signed the Code of Conduct, 
which remains open for signature by other parties.
125
 The agreement established 
procedures for coordinating responses to piracy and sharing best practices among law 
enforcement and security personnel. Accordingly, three regional facilities—the Maritime 
Rescue Coordination Centre in Mombasa, Kenya, the Sub-Regional Coordination Centre 
in Dar el Salaam, Tanzania, and a regional maritime information center that is to be 
established in Sana’a, Yemen—are planned to support the information sharing 
components of the agreement. The parties also agreed to resolutions on technical 
cooperation and the establishment of a regional training center in Djibouti. In September 
2009, Japan made a contribution of $14 million to in support for the IMO’s Djibouti 
Code-related training and capacity building operations.
126
 
        The importance of the Djibouti Code comes from ―addressing local concerns over 
sovereignty, territorial water rights, and the presence of foreign military forces in regional 
waters.‖It was a proactive imitative to engage regional countries in the international anti-
piracy measures taking place off the coast of Somalia.
127
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V. Critical Analysis of Anti- Somali Piracy Measures 
     To begin with, the international community should be accredited for its unusual 
proactive stance toward the crisis of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. For the first time, 
genuine anti-piracy measures were adopted. In fact, those measures went far beyond the 
traditional measures specified in international law. Indeed, throughout the entire crisis, 
Somalia has been used as a testing ground to new set of tryout rules of engagement and 
anti-piracy measures. To now, multiple measures are developing in multiple directions.  
      Briefly, the top three new measures adopted by international community are the 
following: (a) deploying the biggest anti-piracy fleet in the modern history, (b) allowing 
anti-piracy navies to enter the territorial waters of Somalia upon the consent of TFG and 
notification of UN Secretary-General, and (3) the current attempt to bring pirates into 
justice while considering establishing special tribunals for pirates.  
Actually, deploying those massive anti-piracy missions shows an unprecedented 
level of coordination among states in suppressing piracy. No piracy activities have 
received such attention before.   
Signs of Failure of Anti-Somali Piracy Efforts  
      However, the difficult question is, whether those genuine anti-piracy measures have 
been effective in suppressing Somali pirates. The answer is negative. Facts on the ground 
and statistics on pirates’ attacks prove the negative outcome of anti-piracy measures 
adopted in the Gulf of Aden. Despite the intensive military presence off the coast of 
Somalia, it is clear that both international and regional efforts to suppress piracy off the 
coast of Somalia have miserably failed. 
Statistics have shown a major boost in piracy activities off Somali waters. A special 
increase was noted in pirate attacks in terms of range, number of captured vessels, and 
number of attempted attacks. Five years ago, the maximum range of attacks was 287km, 
now it reached 2,037km from the Somali coast and only 926km from the coast of 
India.
128
 In March 2010 alone, there were nine hijackings. Currently, there are eight 
vessels being held by Somali pirates, with roughly 160 hostages on board. The EU naval 
force (Navfor) says the rate of pirate activity in March 2010 alone was double that of the 
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three months from September to November 2009.
129
 Pirate’s big appetite for ships seems 
to be unaffected by the intensive forces patrolling waters off the Somali coast. Therefore, 
warships have failed to deter pirates.   
International anti-piracy measures have failed in another respect. Although all anti-
piracy resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council stressed upon: ―reaffirming of the 
relevant provisions of international law with respect to the repression of piracy… 
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and 
unity of Somalia,‖130 international anti-piracy measures adopted by UN Security Council 
go beyond the traditional anti-piracy measures specified by international law; allowing 
navies not only to track pirates in Somali waters but also to target pirates’ land bases. 
Those anti-piracy measures undermine sovereignty and the territorial integrity of 
Somalia. Further Security Council stresses that those measure exceptional and are only 
applicable for Somalia. Therefore, the UN Security Council seems to be intentionally 
infringing Somalia’s sovereignty contrary to the preamble of its anti-piracy resolutions on 
Somali piracy.   
     Despite the scale of the anti-piracy mission dedicated to curb Somali pirates, 
international measures against Somali piracy are counter-productive because such 
measures are impractical and misguided. Practical constrains and legal complexities 
make Somali anti-piracy efforts appear to be futile.    
A. Practical Constraints 
    Policing the waves is an impossible task, given the size of the area within the reach of 
Somali pirates. Somali piracy is an ―expanding phenomenon, both in terms of level of 
activity and range.‖131 International naval forces operate in a zone extending from south 
of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles, 
which represents an area comparable to that of the Mediterranean.
132
 The chief 
commander of EU’s operation Atlanta said that there are altogether about twenty 
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warships to cover an area ten times larger than Germany.
133
Given the massive volume of 
shipping in the region ―the safety of all ships can not be guaranteed due to the often long 
response times due to the considerable distances involved.‖134 
        Therefore, there is a significant challenge for international navies to patrol the 
massive waters surrounding the long Somali coast, even with its largest anti-piracy fleet 
in modern history. The geographical location is a major practical constraint in the way of 
international efforts to suppress piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Somali pirates simply 
adapted their technique to the presence of naval powers. Pirates have simply shifted their 
operations from the Gulf of Aden towards the open waters, in the direction of the western 
Indian Ocean.  
      Another practical constraint facing anti-piracy missions is the factor of time. 
According to reports, ―most vessels under attack have less than 15 to 30 minutes between 
the first sighting of the pirates and their boarding of the ship and taking of hostages.‖ If a 
naval ship fails to arrive on the scene within those first 15 to 30 minutes, it will be too 
late to prevent the ship’s capture. Generally, naval combatant ships can steam at speeds 
of up to 30 knots, while the speed of pirates’ skiffs reach 53 knots using the Yamaha 150 
horsepower motors.
135
 Pirates’ boasts are faster than warships.  Thus, unless a naval ship 
happens to be few miles away when a commercial ship comes under attack, it will not 
arrive until after (perhaps long after) the fifteen to thirty minutes window has come and 
gone. Given the large area of water to be patrolled and the relatively small number of 
naval ships available means that the closest naval ship is often far too distant to arrive 
within that tight timeframe.
136
 Once pirates are on board and the hijacked vessel under 
control, any attempt of rescue becomes too risky.  
       To sum up, considerable practical factors stand in the way of international anti-piracy 
missions operating in the Gulf of Aden. Somali pirates continue to be successful in what 
they do, as factors of time, distance, and speed are on their side. The element of surprise 
puts anti-piracy navies on the defensive. The phenomenon of Somali piracy has 
illustrated the limits of a military option in preventing or even suppressing piracy.  
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1. The Negative Implications of Military Intervention in Suppressing Piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden: 
    After examining the practical constraints facing international navies, it is time to 
explore the serious negative implications of using force in suppressing Somali piracy. 
The Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
allowing the use of force. All Security Council Resolutions regarding Somalia have one 
sentence in common which is ―states fighting piracy may use all necessary means to 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.‖137 Many voices are demanding the use of 
decisive force in dealing with Somali pirates in support of risky rescue military 
operations. The UN envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, backed military 
operations saying they "are sending a strong message to the pirates and, more 
importantly, to their backers who are exploiting the poverty and desperation of their 
young, unemployed compatriots."
138
 Also, the UN International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
head Noel Choong said: "We support the robust response against the pirates."
139
 
Indeed,CTF-151 killed alone 10 pirates in a period of 7 months.
140
  
However, excessive use of force by international navies in suppressing Somali pirates 
has four serious repercussions. It leads to retaliation. It causes further humiliation to 
Somali people, as it eradicates the sovereignty of Somalia. In addition, it increases the 
death tool among civilians.   
First and foremost, the use of force in suppressing Somali pirates has proven to be 
counter productive. Although Somali pirates use heavy weapons in their hijacking, they 
rarely inflict any harm on their hostages, cargo, or the hijacked ship. Most hostages 
acknowledge the humane treatment they receive during their detention. Hostages’ 
personal belongs have not been touched.  The content of the hijacked cargos is kept safe. 
Unlike traditional pirates who accompany their piratical activities with long list of crimes 
which expand to include murder, rape, and theft. Although Somali pirates are heavy 
armed, they have used violence under precautions. Somali pirates have only one single 
demand, ransom. Pirates of the Gulf of Aden directly communicate with the ship owner. 
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However, in a number of incidents, anti-piracy missions’ use of violence has provoked 
Somali pirates groups to take revenge. Consequently, a cycle of violence and retaliation 
between the two sides has been initiated.  Use of force by warships to apprehend or kill 
pirate suspects has raised feelings of revenge especially among pirates whose associates 
are killed or captured.
141
 For example, after three Somali pirates were killed in the US 
military rescue operation to release the captain of the MV Maersk Alabam, Somali pirates 
attacked an American freighter with rockets to "destroy" the ship in revenge.  A Somali 
pirate commander Abdi Garad told AFP, that:  
We intended to destroy this American-flagged ship and the crew on board but 
unfortunately they narrowly escaped us.  The aim of this attack was totally 
different. We were not after a ransom. We also assigned a team with special 
equipment to chase and destroy any ship flying the American flag in retaliation for 
the brutal killing of our friends.
142
 
 
 According to sources close to the pirates, French ships were also prime targets following 
the rescue of the Tanit yacht in which a hostage and two pirates were killed.
143
 Violence 
only begets violence. Further, escalation of violence seems to be the new trend.  The 
paradox is that warships, which are responsible for protecting vessels carrying their 
state’s flag, maximize the threat of pirate attacks upon its flag vessels rather alleviating 
the threat. In other words, warships are doing more harm to vessels carrying their flag 
then.  
Secondly, authorizing warships to enter Somali territorial waters to fights pirates 
violates the sovereignty of Somalia which leads to further humiliation of the Somali 
people. There are widespread feelings of suspicion among Somalis toward foreign navies. 
Many are skeptical of their agenda, while other fear those anti-piracy missions might be a 
form of indirect occupation. Feelings of animosity were aroused after French military 
executed land operations against Somali pirates. From time to time, US send missile 
attacks against targets of Al-Qaeda in Somalia. Many innocent Somalis fall dead in such 
land operations. Somalis feel that the international community has failed them and give 
the green light to superpowers to hunt Somalis. Indeed, a sense of conspiracy and mutual 
mistrust dominates the feelings of Somalis toward warship patrolling Somali waters. That 
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is largely due to UN did not extend its mandate allowing warships patrolling Somali 
waters to prevent illegal fishing or nuclear waste dumping. None of the Security Council 
resolutions mentioned illegal fishing or hazardous waste dumping.
144
 That is why the 
Somalis accuse Security Council of double standards. For example, Obama said that the 
pirates must be held accountable for their crimes. Many Somalis want to know when the 
western world will be held accountable for dumping nuclear toxic waste and illegal 
fishing.
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  Consequently, international anti-piracy coalitions lost the hearts and minds of 
Somalis, while pirates gain more popularity inside. Thus, excessive use of force against 
pirates sometimes leads to unfavorable outcomes.  
In the final analysis, although deploying warships to suppress Somali pirates is a 
needed measure to deter them, this measure failed to achieve its purpose because of 
serious practical constrains limits its effectiveness. Further, excessive use of force in 
apprehending or killing pirates has danger implications on the long run.  
B. Legal Complexities  
A long list of various legal complexities, related to capturing, holding, and 
prosecuting of Somali pirates, has doomed international anti-piracy missions to 
failure. Serious legal complexities surrounding anti-piracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden do exist.  
The case of Somali piracy sheds light upon logistic and legal difficulties face 
anti-piracy effort which attempt to bring Somali pirates into justice, in order to 
be held accountable for their crimes. However, this appears to be difficult task. 
Mix of logistical, legal, operational and political difficulties make chances to bring 
pirates to justice are remote.146 There are challenges to prosecute pirates in the 
stages of capturing, detention, and trial.  
To begin with, capturing of pirates by warship is extremely difficult because 
Somali pirates use smart evasive strategies to escape navies. If a warship appears 
in the scene before pirates can take control of the attacked ship, then there is a 
fair chance of catching them. However, once pirates see a warship approaching 
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their speedboats, they flee in different directions, making it impossible to catch 
all of them. Therefore, a warship will decide to go after one speedboat and leave 
the rest of the pirates in other speedboats escape. If the warship is about to 
capture pirates onboard the speedboat, pirates quickly drop their weapons in the 
sea and destroy evidence. Therefore, when the military personals search the boat, 
they find nothing. When pirates are faced with the crime of piracy, they deny the 
crime and claim that they are illegal migrants to a neighboring state. Now, it is 
extremely hard to prove their crime. Lack of evidence is e a major challenge 
which undermines the process of prosecution. Prosecution and bringing pirates 
to trail becomes pointless and a waste of time and resources. Large numbers of 
pirates have been acquitted due to lack of material evidence.147  
The second stage towards bringing pirates to justice is holding them after 
their capture and transferring them to the country in which they will be 
prosecuted. After the capture of Somali pirates, they will be detained within the 
warship which made the arrest. However, the task of transferring pirate suspects 
to face trial is a heavy burden on navies operating in the region. The process of 
transferring arrested suspects is both costly and time consuming which affects 
the overall performance of warships’ roles in patrolling their assigned area. 
Therefore, many pirate suspects spend long duration of time in detention on 
board of warships without facing any crime. This delays their prosecution with no 
specific time table for their prosecution.148 Because of lack of evidence and 
logistical difficulties in transferring pirates to face trial, many navies avoid this 
complication by releasing pirates from their custody after disarming them. For 
example, in the period of January 2009 to August 2009, CTF-151 ―encountered 527 
pirates; 282 of which were disarmed and released, 235 disarmed and turned over for 
prosecution, and 10 were killed.‖149 It is worth noting that the number of released pirates 
is larger than the number of those turned in prosecution.
150
 As a result, anti-piracy navies 
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operating off the Somali waters have already lost its deterrence affect upon pirates. This 
simply sends wrong signals to pirates. In response, pirates have become more aggressive 
and undeterred by navies patrolling Somali waters.   
       The last stage is prosecuting the pirates to face a fair trial. The first question is where 
to prosecute pirate suspects. Although international law gives all the states jurisdiction to 
prosecute pirates, few states are willing to do so. Few states have adopted the crime of 
piracy in their national legislation. In the beginning, western navies were eager to 
prosecute pirates in their countries. However, western navies are now discouraged from 
doing so for number of reasons. First, the long distance between the theaters of anti-
piracy operations from the home country makes the transfer process exhaustive and 
costly.  Secondly, many pirates, who are acquitted of their crimes and released, have 
turned into asylum seekers and have refused to go back to Somalia. This has created 
further burden to on the western countries that carry the entire prosecution process.  
      Therefore, anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden have tried to avoid this 
complication by transferring pirates to neighboring regional states, mainly Kenya and 
Yemen. However, those two countries have inefficient judicial systems. Kenya, for 
example, has been subject to brutal criticism from human rights activists for inhumane 
acts which suspects commonly receive during detention, prosecution and imprisonment.  
Kenyan prisons are already overcrowded. It was reported that a suspect may wait as long 
as a year for his or her trial to be held. Anti-piracy missions, with the support of EU and 
UN, have allocated funds to improve the judicial systems in those countries. In other 
words, it was an attempt to buy the consent of Yemeni and Kenyan authorities to receive 
pirates with no question. A fair trail to pirates is hard to guarantee. That is why many 
observers see anti-piracy navies useless and are a show for the international media. 
Others call it ―beauty contest.‖ In a recent development, Kenya officially declared its 
refusal to receive any more pirates for prosecution claiming that the burden of 
prosecution is not equally shared with other countries concerned with piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden.  
To sum up, legal complexities surround the arrest, detention, transfer, and prosecution 
of pirates. Legal complexities no longer hold pirates accountable for their crimes and 
turns piracy into a less risky business.   
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 Anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are deeply constrained by practical 
constraints and legal complexities. As a result, Somali pirates continue to expand their 
operation undeterred. The negative outcome of the biggest anti-piracy mission in modern 
history fuels feeling of frustration and shock.    
c. Misguided Efforts 
Although the international community has adopted genuine efforts to suppress piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden, those efforts are counter productive. That is because these anti-
piracy measures are simply misguided, they continue to ignore Somalia and fail to 
address factors contributing to the spread of piracy in Somalia.  
All of the Security Council resolutions have tackled Somali piracy while disregarding 
to Somalia. In other words, the international community has dealt with piracy as a 
separate problem without looking to the bigger picture. Thus, the international 
community needs to look at the bigger picture and to carefully analyze factors 
contributing to the spread of piracy especially off the cost of Somali. The solution to 
piracy lies in the land not in the sea. 
The most powerful weapon against piracy will be peace and opportunity in 
Somalia, coupled with an effective and reliable police force and judiciary. 
Containing or ignoring Somalia and its problems is not an option that will 
end well.
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As we have seen, little has been done to improve Somalia’s harsh realities. The positive 
side of piracy is shedding some light on the ongoing tragedy in Somalia, the forgotten 
country. It seems that the international community pretends to ignore Somalia. 
Nonetheless, Somali piracy has brought Somali back into surface. Ignoring Somalia is not 
an option.  
 International efforts have been fixed on the sea and not toward the shore. 
Commanders of anti-piracy navies have only now realized that the solution to piracy lies 
on land not in the sea. Warships may reduce the number of pirates’ attacks, but they can 
not uproot piracy form the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. 
Attention slowly is moving toward Somalia. However, efforts continue to be 
misguided. Funds allocated to Somalia rarely benefit Somalia and its people. It can be 
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argued that funds allocated to Somalia and fighting Somali piracy ends in foreign pockets 
away from Somalia.   
Regional and international anti-piracy efforts are only focusing on military operations and 
prosecution of pirates. Instead of fixing Somalia’s judicial institutions, massive funds have been 
assigned to Somalia’s neighboring countries to improve their judicial systems to be well-equipped 
to prosecute Somali pirates. Enormous funds have been directed to that purpose. A US National 
Security Council report recommends that the US has to seek agreements and arrangements to 
formalize custody and prosecution arrangements with regional states.
152
  In this regard, an 
agreement was signed between EU and Kenya on the 6
th
 of March 2009, giving the Kenyan 
authorities the right to prosecute pirates. Indeed, regional countries offered their services on the 
war against pirates in exchange for funds which should have been spent on Somalia in the first 
place.  
When regional countries, as Kenya, were no longer able to prosecute pirates, international 
community is considering establishing international tribunals for pirates.  Additional funds would 
be directed in this direction. The international media would closely monitor those tribunals, while 
Somalia’s judicial system would continue to be marginalized.   
At the Donor Conference on Somalia, hosted by the EU on 23
rd
 April 2009, UN 
proposed raising $166 million to be raised- $135 million for African Union's military mission 
to Somalia (AMISOM) and only $31 million for the Somalia security forces.
153
 More than two 
thirds of the fund is allocated to the 4,350 foreign troops of AMISOM while the Somali 
army and police force continue to suffer from lack of funds, training, arms and 
ammunition.  The TFG fails to pay the salaries of its police forces because of lack of 
resources. Somalis have expressed their frustration at the way the funds are allocated.  
Massive funds were dedicated to anti-piracy military operations. The joint funding of only the 
EU’s Atlanta operation alone amounts to EUR 8.3 million. The cost of patrolling Somali waters is 
very expensive.  Unfortunately, all those funds are misguided. In a sense, those funds are directed 
to tackling piracy, apart form Somalia. If those funds were reallocated to development, poverty 
reduction, supporting Somali police forces and government’s institutions, piracy would be 
affected. The stronger i the government, the weaker the pirates are.     
The international community has to reconsider the viability of durable solution for piracy 
rather than heavily investing in unsustainable military options which have been proven to be 
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ineffective and costly. Neither supporting AMISOM, anti-piracy operations, regional 
countries’ judicial systems nor establishing international tribunals will suppress piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden. Redirecting a portion of those funds to rebuilding Somalia’s 
government institutions is the key to a durable solution to piracy. The stronger Somalia, 
the weaker the pirates are. The current misguided anti-piracy efforts have to refocus on 
rebuilding the Somali state where the roots of the problem are found.  
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VI. The Way Forward 
It is time for the international community to invest in a durable solution for 
Somali piracy. A comprehensive approach has to be adopted in fighting piracy. Ending 
piracy requires a well-integrated anti-piracy plan with short, medium and long-term 
measures. Tackling the roots of piracy in Somalia is the way forward.  
First, international community need to  openly confront the issue of illegal fishing 
and dumping of nuclear waste off Somali waters, in order to gain credibility form the 
Somali people. Indeed, international community should provide technical assistance to 
developing countries unable to protect its territorial waters, and its economic interests in 
their exclusive economic zones. Continuing to be silent about illegal fishing and waste 
dumping committed by European and Asian commercial vessels would strengthen the 
pirates’ claim of protecting Somali waters. Second, improving the conditions of coastal 
communities is a good starting point. Third, international community should fight piracy 
by fighting poverty, unemployment in Somalia. Therefore, international community 
needs to adopt radical changes in its strategies to combat piracy.    
In the final analysis, I would argue that there are two set of factors contributing to 
Somali piracy: factors relating to Somalia in general and factors relating to coastal 
Somali communities specifically. The first set of factors feeding piracy is the current 
chaotic political situation which is marked by an ineffective central government, civil 
war, and tribal welfare. The second set of factors contributing to piracy originates from 
Somali coastal communities, the breeding ground of pirates. What drives coastal 
communities toward piracy are illegal fishing, nuclear waste dumping, and poverty. 
Consequently, anti-piracy measures have to respond to those two sets of factors feeding 
piracy in Somalia. Before the situation can be resolved, international and regional anti-
piracy efforts will continue to be misguided and surely ineffective. Generalized responses 
to piracy are a shortcut to failure.  
Anti-piracy measures have to respond to the roots of the problem in order to 
guarantee its effectiveness in the long-term. Undoubtedly, building a military coalition to 
patrol ships passing by Somali waters is a needed measure to deter pirates. However, it is 
crucial to ask ourselves to what extent such measures are sustainable and to what extent 
they responds to the roots of the problem.  
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Regional and international anti-piracy efforts should meet the following three goals: 
(1) strengthening Somalia’s central government to impose rule of law, (2) reviving 
Somalia’s economy to provide an alternative to piracy, and (3) solving the problems of 
Somali coastal communities’ especially illegal fishing and nuclear waste dumping off 
Somali waters.  
Any future anti-piracy measure has to comply with the following criteria. Firstly, the 
anti-piracy measure has to be compatible with international law. Secondly, it has to 
respond to the social and economic factors contributing to the emergence of piracy. The 
arsenal of anti-piracy tools has to expand to include trust building mechanisms with local 
communities. New and customized anti-piracy measures should be tailored to the specific 
circumstances of each case of piracy. In this decisive moment, the international 
community must revise its strategies in responding to piracy and today’s fragile maritime 
security regime has to be re-examined.  Difficult questions have to be answered. Only 
then Somali piracy becomes a history.  
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Appendix A: Map of Somalia
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Appendix B: Horn of Africa: Shipping Routes
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Appendix C: Range of Attacks
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Appendix D: Statistics Jan-Sept. 2009157 
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Appendix E: Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and International Waters
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